Nietzsche Contra the Real World

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Abstract

This essay outlines three geographical problem-spaces illuminated by Nietzsche. The first is Nietzsche’s counterpoint to the ‘real world’: the ‘apparent world’. The second is a non-totalizing, political elaboration of the first, what Deleuze once called “the local fires of Heraclitus.” The third, Europe, is a space that Nietzsche wrote from and against, a space best approached through a postcolonial, transcritical reading.

And do you know what ‘the world’ is to me? … The world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end… a play of forces and waves of forces. (Nietzsche, 1968 [1885], 549)

If to be a geographer means that one studies and writes of the world, then Nietzsche could be seen as one of the great geographers, although his tools for writing – hammer, typewriter, genealogy, destruction – are either missing or often misunderstood. Yet I do not intend to fend for a specifically Nietzschean geography. Given the debts to Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault, one might

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1 Creative Commons licence: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
2 *Twilight of the idols* is subtitled, “how to philosophize with a hammer”. Nietzsche explains this subtitle with the answer: by tapping upon idols (or ideals). Nietzsche was the first philosopher to use a typewriter (Wershler-Henry 2005, 50-51). Nietzsche’s typewriter has not been located. Nietzsche’s genealogy and destruction are not as well known to geographers today as Foucault’s ‘genealogy’ and Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’, but the latter are marked fundamentally by, and would not have been possible without, the former. Derrida attributed to Nietzsche the tradition of the critique of metaphysics; Heidegger claimed that Nietzsche merely encircled it, but failed to escape metaphysics (see 1979 [1961]).
reasonably argue that the fruits of Nietzschean geographical thinking are bearing in
what is often called ‘poststructuralist geography’. Any effort to demarcate a
properly Nietzschean geography within this field would be undermined by
Nietzsche’s thought, which is rigorously anti-systematic and anti-disciplinary. So,
without defining boundaries, we may avow that Nietzsche has lessons to teach us –
albeit not as Geographers, but as thinkers of geographical problems. In this spirit,
my essay gestures to three problem-spaces illuminated by Nietzsche’s texts. By
this I refer to spaces defined by problems that solicit thought. These spaces do not
appear on any map of the real world – indeed, they oppose the real world.

Before proceeding, one fundamental qualification. Staying within the strict
limits of this assignment, my treatment of these three problem-spaces proceeds
with reference to only a few passages from Nietzsche’s considerable opus. It is
evertheless hazardous to build philosophical claims upon such a narrow base, but
especially for Nietzsche: the brilliant, epigrammatic clarity of his writing stands in
stark contrast to the haziness shrouding the totality of his thought. I make no claim
that these remarks represent anything of this totality. On the contrary. Indeed, I
can find no such thing; or, insofar as it exists, it is contradictory, anti-systematic,
and anti-totalizing. Consider one of Nietzsche’s “maxims and arrows” from
Twilight of the Idols: “I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a
system is a lack of integrity” (1990 [1888a], 35). Nietzschean integrity, or rigor, is
a sort that solicits thought that undoes itself.

The apparent world

Let us abolish the real world. (Nietzsche, 1967 [1888b], 254)

Geography constitutes itself as the study of, and writing of, the world. Very
well: but which world? The real one, of course, just as it is. And how do we study
it? By the application of reason.

Put in these terms, Nietzsche’s importance for geographical thought lies in
that his texts violently call into question these basic disciplinary conceptions.
Nietzsche’s texts unsettle these foundations like no other. Their importance lies in
the way that they “cut away the grounds of knowing” (Spivak, 1976, 1). If the word
were not already structurally tainted in geography, we could say that Nietzsche’s
‘method’ for accomplishing this cutting-away is to call into question the value of
inherited truths. As we read in On the Genealogy of Morals: “The will to truth
requires a critique – let us thus define our own task – the value of this truth must

3 Regarding Nietzsche’s influence on poststructuralism, see Schrift (1995).
4 I borrow here Walter Kaufman’s characterization of Nietzsche, “not a system-thinker but a problem-thinker”
(1950, 68).
5 Paul de Man calls Nietzsche’s “allegory of errors … the very model of philosophical rigor” (1979, 118). For
a critique, see Waite (1983).
for once be experimentally called into question” (1967 [1887], 153). Here we can discern the debt of Foucault’s genealogy to Nietzsche.

And we can begin to see what is at stake in Nietzsche’s claim that the “‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ world has only been lyingly added…” (1990 [1888a], 46). For geographers one particular ground matters above all: the ground that we really know the truth of the real world. Because, again, geography constitutes itself as the study of the world – an object, real and true. The task of ‘calling into question’ the truth of the real world – that is, the truth of the world as real, external, object – this task, a central one of the present generation of human geographers, was demarcated quite precisely by Nietzsche in the 1880s. Nietzsche’s texts – particularly those of 1886-8 – aim at destroying Christian platitudes about God’s truth and creation and their object equivalent, ‘the real world’.

In calling into question the truth of the real world Nietzsche is often misunderstood as ‘denying reality’ in the sense of refusing to accept the world as it is. But Nietzsche was no mere refuser; indeed his “formula for greatness” was “amor fati,” love of fate, the embrace of the chance of necessity (1967 [1888b], 258). His calling into question the truth of the real world is instead a demand for agonistic inquiry into the value of the truth of the real world. His texts demand: exactly what is the value of our aprioristic insistence on the reality-truth of the real world? This question compels us to engage with the world as it actually is: apparent, forceful, ensconced in values. Nietzsche writes: “The ‘true world’ and the ‘apparent world’ – that means: the mendaciously invented world and reality” (1967 [1888b], 218). This is no denial of worldly existence. It is a call to return to it, albeit without any of the guarantees that we associate with the concept of the ‘real world.’ Edward Said once wrote that “Nietzsche saw human history as a battle of interpretations” and that his genealogy of morals was about grasping this battle (2002 [1976], 73). To this we might add that Nietzsche’s apparent world is

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6 While we may think Nietzsche’s destructive criticism as pure affirmation, we should not see it as affirmation of the status quo. In Nietzsche and philosophy Deleuze writes: “The sense of Nietzsche’s philosophy is that multiplicity, becoming and chance are objects of pure affirmation. … Affirmation remains as the sole quality of the will to power, action as the sole quality of force, becoming-active as the creative identity of power and willing” (1983 [1962], 197-8). See also Karatani (2003, 123). There is a close relation between Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche with Derrida’s (1982 [1968]) celebration of “Nietzsche’s affirmations.” Yet Derrida’s Nietzsche-affirmation, unlike Deleuze’s, is paired with “Heideggerian hope.” I am inclined toward Derrida’s tone, which is more faithful to Nietzsche’s, and does not align hope with immanence. Note also that, in his brutal critique of Christianity’s contribution to the ‘so-called reality of the real world’, Nietzsche anticipated Gramsci (1959).

7 “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different […]. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it – all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary – but love it” (Nietzsche, 1967 [1888b], 258).

8 In Deleuze’s reading, Nietzsche displaces the truth of the real world to offer a philosophy of values, forces, and senses. This clarifies the meaning of Nietzsche’s substitution of the ‘real world’ for the ‘apparent world’, as Nietzsche once defined ‘apparent world’ as “a world viewed according to values” (1967 [1888b], 305).
likewise an outcome of these battles, and therefore the world itself, geography, may be studied genealogically.\textsuperscript{9}

**Local fires**

Though famously immodest, Nietzsche attributes his critique of the real world to another thinker: Heraclitus.

In so far as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie.... But Heraclitus will always be right in this, that being is an empty fiction. The ‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ world has only been *lyingly added*... (1990 [1888a], 46)

Among the many difficulties with thinking through this itinerary is the fact that we know almost nothing about Heraclitus. Heraclitus, sometimes known as ‘the obscure’ for the enigmatic qualities of his thought, is said to be from Ephesus and to have lived around 500 BC. Heraclitus wrote only one book, which may have been called *On Nature*,\textsuperscript{10} of which we have no extant copy. Our knowledge of it is based mainly on a collection of fragments that have been compiled from the writings of other thinkers, mainly Greeks like Socrates who cited Heraclitus to argue against him. These fragments are famously difficult to translate (see Heidegger 1975 [1954]; Heidegger and Fink 1993 [1967]; Khan (1979); Gadamer 2001 [1999]). Nevertheless, since the Enlightenment a few of the greatest European philosophers have found in Heraclitus a model of philosophical rigor: Nietzsche and Heidegger in particular, but also Hegel.\textsuperscript{11}

Today Heraclitus is best known for one of these fragments, a single ge-philosopheme that has floated down to us though the ages. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel relates it thus: “Plato further says of Heraclitus: ‘He compares things to the current of a river: no one can go twice into the same stream,’ for as it flows on an other water is disturbed” (1892, 283).\textsuperscript{12} Why has this comment about the inability to step into the same river twice lasted for 2,500 years – as long or longer, that is, than any other thought in the Western philosophical tradition? What does this say about our tradition? This may seem like a frivolous

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\textsuperscript{9} For Nietzsche’s critique of the real world, see also passages 5, 9, and 19 from *Human, All Too Human*, section I; Nietzsche’s miniature genealogy in *Twilight of the Idols*, “How the ‘Real World’ at last Became a Myth: History of an Error”; and fragments 461; 470; 520-1; 567-70; 583-85; 600-2; 708; 796; and 1066-1067 of *The Will to Power* (1968 [1885]).

\textsuperscript{10} In some accounts, Heraclitus’ text concerned not nature but the state: see Gadamer (2001 [1999], 22; 42-3).

\textsuperscript{11} In his discussion of pre-Socratic Greek philosophy in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel writes of Heraclitus: “Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic” (1892, 279).

\textsuperscript{12} Gadamer (2001 [1999]) characterizes Heraclitus’ famous river as “an example of the unity of oppositions... The example of the river works best here in terms of the unity of the course of the river and the restlessness of its flow. The mysterious problem that shows itself behind all of these oppositions is apparently the fact that what is the same show itself as an other with no transition” (39).
question – but this would only be because the thought expressed by this philosopheme (“no one can go twice into the same stream”) seems ridiculous to us today. Because of course we can step into a stream, in and out, just as we please, in this real world.

A reply cannot be found in Heraclitus’ fragments. But we may answer by turning to Nietzsche’s text, specifically where the value of the truth of the real world is questioned. Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return repeats differently Heraclitus’s doctrine of non-dialectical opposition.13 (Compare, for instance, Zarathustra’s “go down to rise” with Heraclitus’s saying: “The way upward and downward are one and the same.”14) On this basis we may begin to interpret Nietzsche’s attribution of his critique of the real world from Heraclitus. Although none of the fragments of Heraclitus say the words that Nietzsche attributes to Heraclitus, we can find in fragment 30 something of Nietzsche’s ‘apparent world’:

This world, the same for all, neither any of the gods nor any man has made, but it always was, and is, and shall be, an ever living fire, kindled in due measure, and in due measure extinguished.15

The world always was, and is, and shall be, an ever living fire: here becoming and the eternal return are materialized. They are not cast in stone, but materialize instead as energetic process, fire: pure becoming, the constant conversion of matter and energy. Fire which destroys and creates. With Heraclitus, Nietzsche asks us to think the shape and form of the ‘apparent world’ as a strange world-fire: “a monster of energy, without beginning, without end…” (Nietzsche 1968 [1885],

13 In Ecce Homo we read: “Before me […] tragic wisdom was lacking: I have looked in vain for signs of it even among the great Greeks, those of two centuries before Socrates. I retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel warmer and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destroying, which is the decisive feature of Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of being – all this is clearly more closely related to me than anything else thought to date. The doctrine of the ‘eternal recurrence,’ that is, of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things – this doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus” (Nietzsche, 1967 [1888b], 273-274).

14 Fragment 69 reads: Ὅδος ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡς τῇ. There are two sources. The first is Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. “Up and down he [Heraclitus] says are one and the same.” Also, Diogenes Laert. ix. 8. “Heraclitus says that change is the road leading upward and downward, and that the whole world exists according to it.”

15 Heraclitus, 1889: Κόσμον <τόνδε> τὸν εὐτόν ἄπαντων ὀὗτε τις θέων οὗτε ἀνθρώπων ἑποίησε, ἀλλὰ ἐνθαὶ καὶ έσται καὶ έσται πτος ἀδίκησον, ἀπόθεμεν τέσσαρα ἀποβιβανμένον μέτοχι. There are at least two sources for this fragment. First: Clement of Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 711. Context: “Heraclitus of Ephesus is very plainly of this opinion, since he recognizes that there is an everlasting world on the one hand and on the other a perishable, that is, in its arrangement, knowing that in a certain manner the one is not different from the other. But that he knew an everlasting world eternally of a certain kind in its whole essence, he makes plain, saying in this manner, ‘This world the same for all,’ etc.” Second: Plutarch, de Anim. procreat. 5, p. 1014. Context: “This world, says Heraclitus, neither any god nor man has made; as if fearing that having denied a divine creation, we should suppose the creator of the world to have been some man.”
Reading this same fragment by Heraclitus, Heidegger writes: "World is enduring fire, enduring rising…." (1975 [1954], p. 117).

But here we should take care to read Nietzsche and Heidegger otherwise, toward another politics. Deleuze reads Heraclitus’ fire as a figure for a non-totalizing anti-imperial political theory: "The revolutionary response to American world politics," Deleuze writes, "… is four or five Vietnams" (2004 [1970], 159). (The allusion is to Che Guevara’s dictum that what was needed to bring down US imperialism was “many Vietnams.”) He elaborates on the task of thinking with Heraclitus as a “strategist, combat philosopher”:

Heraclitus says that all things become fire, but is precisely not thinking of a universal conflagration, which he leaves unthought as the nothing of nihilism, showing nihilism necessarily self-overcome or overcome by what is thought in it, in the local fires that unite the peoples of the earth. (Deleuze, 2004 [1970], 159)

What do we learn from Deleuze’s reading of Heraclitus as a “combat philosopher”? The world is “the same for all” – but this is no simple nod toward the unity of the real world. Not at all. The world is the same for all as the ‘apparent world’, one of perpetual flux and (if we can think this word today apart from its conception as a scale) local fires.

So perhaps we have never had geophilosophy at all, but rather pyrophilosophy. Neither ‘the real world’, nor imminent materialism, but world – burning, becoming, Dionysian. Within the apparent world, one seeks not being, nor one fire, but instead a pyrophilosophy of local fires through which world endures.

In the light of the stars and the flames of local fires dance figures of the affirmation of irrecoverable difference.

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16 Heraclitus’ pyrophilosophy may be appropriated into Christian metaphysics (a world of potential hell-fire) but his thought resists this: see Gadamer, 2001 [1999], 28-29, 71-3.
17 “How close and bright would the future appear if two, three, many Vietnams flowered on the face of the globe […] with their repeated blows against imperialism, forcing it to disperse its forces under the lash of the growing hatred of the peoples of the world!” (Guevara, 1967).
18 This reference is to Deleuze and Guattari’s “Geophilosophy” (1994). Arun Saldana (2006) characterizes Deleuzoguattarian space as “one of differences leading to the individuation of systems; of flows forming networks of state and capitalist power; of territories made up from mobilities that exceed them; of desiring-machines that are necessary for the enduring relations of inequality.” The light of the fire of Heraclitus glows here.
19 This reiterates an earlier citation of Heidegger on Heraclitus: “world is enduring fire, enduring rising” (1975 [1954], 117).
Europe

Nietzsche scrutinized the way of being a free subject in the practical sense. His thoughts have nothing to do with affirmation of status quo. And his ‘will to power’ is attained by bracketing the determination of causality; nevertheless what he forgot was the need to see the world by unbracketing it now and then. (Kojin Karatani, 2003, 123)

Today any responsible discussion of Nietzsche and geography requires thought – perhaps the sort executed with a hammer – of the concept-space, ‘Europe’. If Spivak is correct to say that Nietzsche and Freud, more than any other European thinkers, called into question the structural distinction between the ideal and the material (1976, 105), then we must add that they did not do so in a way that attended to the becoming-space of this task. On the contrary.20

Earlier I noted that Nietzsche attributed his inspiration for the destruction of the real world to one ‘Heraclitus of Ephesus’. But where is Ephesus? Today Ephesus is known as Efes, a town in the territory of the modern nation-state of Turkey. Here one can visit the very river where Heraclitus is supposed to have been inspired to make his famous statement about the stepping in the flux of things. The banks of the River Meander (from which we geographers obtain the verb ‘to meander’) are protected by a park that memorializes Heraclitus. If we were to visit this riverbank, where would we be? In Europe? Is Turkey European?

Let us suppose the answer to both questions is no: that despite the best attempts of the Turkish state to change this condition, let us say that Turkey is not European (after all, ‘Anatolia’ is itself a name for this land – from the Greek – that means ‘east of Greece’). Then the River Meander, Büyük Menderes, flows westward into the Aegean Sea, but from the East, not-Europe. What then of Heraclitus’ doctrine about being, inspired by this famously impermanent stream? Is it no longer cherished pre-Socratic ground for Western philosophy? Was I wrong to write above that Heraclitus’ fragment about the inability to step into the same river twice is older than any other thought in the Western philosophical tradition?

Asking such questions clarifies the impossibility of discerning and settling such questions on the basis of geographical boundaries. What matters here is not the elusive dividing line between Europe and not-Europe, but the productive flow of Büyük Menderes that spaces Europe. Büyük Menderes meanders as a border problem for Europe’s very thought of European thought. Just as we cannot step in the same river twice, we cannot orient ourselves to ‘Western thought’ by the flux of

20 It is curious that Spivak left Marx off this list, since his theory of value in Capital ruptures the distinction between the ideal and the material.
the River Meander – nor any other geographical object in the ‘real world’. The legendary impermanence of Büyük Menderes only conforms to this river’s spacing (of) an instable world that resists division.  

In her preface to Of Grammatology (1976), Spivak locates Derrida’s text as a thread of the social text of the ‘philosophers of difference’ that includes Deleuze, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Heraclitus. To read Nietzsche geographically is to inherit this tradition’s critique of the real world. But it is also to undo the very thought that such a tradition is of or for the West, European. To say this differently: the problem of Europe – the fact that it is violently reproduced through an essentially imperial division of the world (Said 1978; Wainwright 2005) – means that our reading of Nietzsche (and Heraclitus) should be postcolonial.

A postcolonial reading clarifies two crucial guidelines for reading Nietzsche. First: notwithstanding the facts that (a) Nietzsche hated Germanophilia, nationalism, and state power; (b) Nietzsche’s sister abused Nietzsche’s texts to put them to work for the Nazi party; (c) the pragmatism that asks only of a philosopher, ‘and what was your voting record?’ is a thoughtless and anti-leftist protocol – notwithstanding these three facts, we must still insist there is no point in trying to deny or hide the connection between Nietzsche and Nazism. This is to reiterate Spivak:

[A]s Derrida has argued about Nietzsche and Nazism, it is futile to excuse away the connections between the texts of Marx and the possibility of reading them so as to support totalitarianism or modernization. No possible reading is a mis-reading. The spirit of refutation and de-fetishization is a homo-erotic adventure that simply gives the game to the best arguer, the best manipulator of power. The challenge of deconstruction is not to excuse [Marx, Nietzsche, or anyone else], but to suspend accusation to examine with painstaking care if the protocols of the text contains a moment that can produce something that will generate a new and useful reading. (1999, 98)

This essay cannot examine the texts of Nietzsche with such care. Yet it may indicate why doing so is necessary.

A second postcolonial guideline for reading Nietzsche: it is futile to deny the connections between the texts of Nietzsche and the production of European philosophy as a self-narrating, and exclusionary, disciplinary tradition. One must out-Nietzsche Nietzsche at the task of destroying metaphysics qua European

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21 Büyük Menderes is not alone in having these qualities. There is nothing essential about it. Heraclitus’ thought is not dependent on a particular river. Nor is the concept ‘Europe’ dependent upon a particular geographical boundary.
Consider again the Nietzsche-Heraclitus relation. Like Heidegger after him, Nietzsche drew inspiration from Heraclitus atavistically, as a nostalgic return to the sweet age before Socrates and metaphysics. Heidegger and Nietzsche celebrate Heraclitus’ supposed turn away from the business of the public sphere within Empire, and his withdrawal into the temple of Artemis for space to think. Nietzsche writes:

When Heraclitus withdrew into the courtyards and colonnades of the great temple of Artemis, this was a worthier ‘desert’ [than we may find today], I admit: why do we lack such temples? […] That which Heraclitus avoided, however, is still the same as that which we shun today: the noise and democratic chatter of the Ephesians, their politics, their latest news of the ‘Empire’ (the Persian, you understand), their market business of ‘today’ – for we philosophers need to be spared one thing above all: everything to do with ‘today.’ (1967 [1887], 109)

Here we may find strong parallels to Heidegger’s celebration of Heraclitus as a thinker in the wilderness (1961 [1953]; 1975 [1954]) as well as his condemnation in Being and Time of chatter, ‘average everydayness’, and the market (1996 [1927]). Nietzsche and Heidegger, in other words, find inspiration in Heraclitus’ thought partly for its spatiality, because they admire his departure from the clamor of the polis. There is of course another geographical dimension here. Heraclitus was not ‘European’, except that Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger place him – in different respects – at the head of the great European tradition. To repeat: it is futile to deny the connection between the Nietzsche-Heraclitus itinerary and the production of ‘European’ philosophy as a self-narrating, exclusionary, disciplinary tradition.

Following Spivak, I have called these ‘postcolonial’ guidelines. But reading the Marxist philosopher Kojin Karatani (2003), we could equally call these transcritical. Consider Karatani’s argument about Heraclitus’ space of thought – entering where he discusses the merits of Heidegger’s critique of Descartes’ conception of spatiality and the subject in Being and Time (1996 [1927]):

[I]n criticizing Descartes, Heidegger [like Nietzsche] returned to the pre-Socratics. To be kept always in mind, however, is the fact that these thinkers were foreigners to Athens. Being in the Mediterranean space of intercourse, they thought in the interstices, or intermundia – to use Marx’s favorite term from Epicurus. They did not depart from

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22 This is how I interpret the work of Derrida and Spivak.
23 For evidence of Nietzsche’s atavism for the pre-Socratics generally, and Heraclitus in particular, see fragments 419 and 437 of The Will to Power (1968).
any *polis* as the self-evident premise of their thinking. Parmenides, for instance, defied the Gods, and Heraclitus rebuked community rituals. … Although it was the center of politics and information, Athens was initially less developed with respect to thinking than were the margins of the Greek world. The people of the Athenian community, who were enjoying their politico-economic hegemony, suddenly experienced an inundation of the *paradoxa* of previously unknown thinkers. (Karatani, 2003, 98)

What we blithely speak of today as ‘Western philosophy’ thus was not created in Athens, or anywhere else in ‘Europe’. Not only because Europe did not exist in Heraclitus’ time. Rather because what we think of as ‘Western philosophy’ emerges, continues to emerge, through the turbid “inundation” – the flux – of a torrent of thought that transforms as it flows. This flux did not begin within ‘Europe’; nor did it begin ‘outside’ it, for no such boundary existed. Nor does it today, but differently again.

So one could define the geography of the Heraclitus-Athenian engagement by the Aegean Sea under Greek hegemony. Yet, as Karatani argues: “[r]ather than thinking in the space of a community gathered around a univocal set of rules,” the thought of Heraclitus emerges within “a heterogeneous space of intermundial intercourse” (2003, 99). Heraclitus thought not in Europe, nor outside, but otherwise and elsewhere.

Perhaps we may say the same for Nietzsche – the one that follows Heraclitus in destroying the real world. This would be a generous reading, one that desired to affirm the Nietzsche who wrote: “No limit to the ways in which the world can be interpreted” (1967 [1888], 326). Very well. Be generous. A postcolonial, transcritical geography should aim to generate new and useful readings.

**Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Nurcan Atalan-Helicke, David Butz, Paul Kingsbury, Arun Saldanha, Jacqueline Vadjunec, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

**References**


